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CASE NOTES
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union:
Preventing Backdoor Discrimination
Actions or Closing the Door?
I.

INTRODUCTION

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens ....
42 U.S.C. Section 1981 was passed by the post-Civil War Con2
gress in 1866 pursuant to its thirteenth amendment powers. Until
recently, the United States Supreme Court consistently interpreted this
language broadly to include conditions of employment as well as the
formation and enforcement of employment contracts.' As recently as
1987, the Supreme Court held that racial harassment and discrimination in the conditions of employment constituted a violation of section
1981.4

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
2. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See infra note 21 and
accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661-62 (1987)
("Section 1981 has a much broader focus than contractual rights ... guaranteeing
the personal right to engage in economically significant activity free from racially
discriminatory interference."); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S.
273, 287 (1976) ("Sec. 1981 is applicable to racial discrimination in private employment . . . ."); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975)
(discriminatory conditions of employment held actionable under both section 1981
and Title VII).
4. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987). The issue in
Goodman was which statute of limitations should govern a section 1981 claim for
racially discriminatory practices including racial harassment. The Goodman Court
chose the personal injury statute over the statute applicable to interference with
contractual rights, noting the broad interpretation given the statute beyond contractual
rights. Id. at 661-62.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

In 1989, the Supreme Court, in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union,5 held that section 1981 does not include an action for racial
harassment during employment. 6 The issues in Pattersonwere whether
section 1981 could encompass an action against a private party and,
if so, whether the plaintiff's claim was within the scope of the statute.
While the Court reaffirmed its holding in Runyon v. McCrary7 that
section 1981 does reach acts of discrimination in the private sector, it
confined the statute to its specific language' despite earlier decisions
by the Court supporting a broader interpretation. 9
The Patterson decision was reached after a divided Court, on its
own initiative, ordered the parties to brief and argue the issue of
whether the Runyon interpretation that section 1981 applies to private
acts of discrimination should be reconsidered. 10 The Court reaffirmed
Runyon, yet it remains to be seen if, as Justice Stevens predicted in
his dissent from the order of reargument, "some of the harm that
will flow from today's order may never be completely undone.""
Justice Stevens' concern that the decision would lead to uncertainty
as to the Supreme Court's position on racial discrimination 2 seems
to have become a reality. Lower courts which have considered the
issue have expressed their confusion at the seemingly contradictory
interpretations of section 1981.' 3 On the one hand, Runyon and its
5. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
6. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2372 (1989).

7. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). Runyon was an action brought by black parents on

behalf of their children who had been denied admission to private schools because
of their race. The Court determined that petitioners had been denied the same
opportunity to enter into a contract with the school as was extended to white students,
thus implicating section 1981. Id. at 173.
8. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372.
9. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); McDonald

v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
10. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988).
11. Id. at 1423 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12. Id.

13. See discussion of Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1312 (7th Cir.
1989) ("We show no disrespect to the Supreme Court by suggesting that the scope
of Patterson is uncertain."); Hall v. County of Cook, 719 F. Supp. 721, 723 (N.D.
111.1989) ("[S]everal courts have grappled with th[e] question [whether discriminatory

discharge is actionable under section 1981] in the ... months since the Supreme
Court's decision [in Patterson]."); Jordan v. U.S. West Direct Co., 716 F. Supp.
1366, 1369 (D. Colo. 1989) ("I encourage the parties to bring to my attention
pertinent case authority interpreting the Patterson decision."); infra notes 185-204

and accompanying text.
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progeny profferred a broad reading of the statute. While the Patterson
Court declined to overturn Runyon, its interpretation of section 1981
extremely narrowed the scope of the claims encompassed by the
statute.
The Court justified its interpretation by suggesting that it is
consistent with the spirit and intent of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964' 4 which provides for administrative as well as judicial
remedies in employment discrimination cases. 5 While emphasizing the
overlap between the two statutes,1 6 the Court overlooked those situations where Title VII is unavailable. In fact, because of its many
prerequisites, 7 Title VII excludes approximately 10.7 million workers.' 8 Under its newly-narrowed interpretation, section 1981 will also
be unavailable to these workers as a remedy for ongoing discrimination.
This note will examine the Patterson decision and its consideration of prior decisions and Congressional intent. Part II will include
a brief history of section 1981 and a discussion of its importance in
the area of racial discrimination in the workplace. Part III will focus
on the Patterson decision and its rationale. Finally, the future impact
of Patterson will be examined in Part IV.

II.

HIsTORY

Much of the confusion as to Congress' intent in enacting section
1981 arose from the fact that the statute was enacted twice.' 9 The
statute was initially enacted in 1866 as part of Congress' thirteenth
amendment powers and then reenacted in 1870 in conjunction with
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
15. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2374-75 (1989).
16. Id. at 2375.

17. For example, Title VII defines employer as "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1982). Excluded from Title VI's coverage are religious corporations, associations,
educational institutions, and societies, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1982), as well as some
agencies of the United States government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982). In addition,
a Title VII action must be filed within 180 days after the unlawful employment
practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982).
18. Eisenberg & Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
596, 602 (1988).
19. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Jones reviewed the
legislative history of both section 1981 and section 1982 and determined that the two
provisions were derived from the 1866 Act and that the 1870 reenactment in no way
limited the two statutes. Id. at 436.
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other statutes passed pursuant to Congress' fourteenth amendment
powers.2o
The Supreme Court settled this debate in Jones v. Alfred H.
Meyer Co.2 by holding that the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 (which includes both sections 1981 and 1982) mandates
a finding that the statute was passed in 1866 pursuant to the thirteenth
amendment.2 2 The issue before the Court in Jones was whether section
1982 of the 1866 Act covered a refusal by a white person to sell his
home to a black family solely on the basis of race.23 The Jones Court
held that section 1982 did cover such an action. 4 The Court also
decided that the readoption of the statute in 1870 in no way limited
the scope of the 1866 Act. 23 It further found that the main focus of
Congress at the time both acts were passed was not state action but
the activities of such hostile private groups as the Ku Klux Klan. 26
Thus the law was intended to encompass both types of actions. 27
20. The question presented by the statute's reenactment was whether the law
was passed pursuant to Congress' power stemming from section 2 of the thirteenth
amendment or if, as some commentators and jurists feel, the law was first passed in
1870. The thirteenth amendment gave Congress the power to enact laws which would
prohibit "slavery" and "involuntary servitude" and is not limited solely to actions
of the states or the federal government. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The 1870 Act has
been considered to be a fourteenth amendment statute, coinciding with the passing
of the amendment itself. If the latter were true, then the law would be pursuant to
Congress' fourteenth amendment powers which address only state action. U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XIV, § 2. This view would hold the statute inapplicable to actions of private
parties (this view was taken by Justice White in his dissenting opinion in Runyon).
Jones, 392 U.S. at 436. For further analysis of the legislative history debate see
Blum, Section 1981 Revisited: Looking Beyond Runyon and Patterson, 32 How. L.J.
1 (1989); Sullivan, HistoricalReconstruction, Reconstruction History and the Proper
Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541 (1989); Livingston & Marcosson, The Court
at the Crossroads: Runyon, Section 1981 and the Meaning of Precedent, 37 EMORY
L.J. 949 (1988); Comment, Developments-Section 1981, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 29, 41-42 (1980).
21. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). The plaintiffs in Jones were blacks who challenged
defendants' refusal to sell the plaintiffs a home solely on the basis of their race.
Their challenge was based on section 1982 which reads:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).
22. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 423-25 (1968).
23. Id. at 413-14.
24. Id. at 436.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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In discussing the legislative history of the 1866 Act, the Jones
Court referred to the "prevailing public sentiment" deploring the
oppression of the freed slaves.2" According to the author of the Act,
this public sentiment led to the bill's introduction in Congress. 9 The
Jones Court viewed the indication of public support for the law to
confirm its belief that the law was intended to cover all types of racial
discrimination and should be accorded a broad interpretation.30
As support for this view, the Jones Court cited a report which
was before the Congress when the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
introduced.3 1 This report discussed, among other problems, the working conditions which faced freed slaves when they were employed by
the southern planters.32 The author of the report found that the
former slaveholders were treating the new "workers" like slaves, as
if nothing had changed. 33 While the freed slaves may not have
encountered problems in making labor contracts under the new system, the conditions under which they were forced to work often
imposed undue restrictions and penalties. 4 Among these were corporal
punishment to correct misbehavior, restrictions on freedom to leave
the plantation or receive visitors, and fines or imprisonment for
showing disrespect toward the employer. 5
Although the Jones Court considered section 1982 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, the federal appellate courts soon followed its lead
in the interpretation of section 1981. The seventh circuit led the way
with Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Intl Harvester Co.36 The
plaintiffs in Waters alleged that the employer engaged in discriminatory hiring practices designed to exclude blacks from obtaining bricklayer positions at its plant.37 The Waters court examined the holding
38
of Jones and the legislative history as reviewed by the Jones Court.
Accordingly, the Waters court concluded that section 1981 was in28. Id. at 431 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77).
29. Id.
30. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436-37 (1968).
31. Id. at 428-29 (quoting Report of C. Schurz, S. Exec. Doc. No. 2, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 17-25 (1865)).
32. Report of C. Schurz, S. Exec. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1865).
33. Id. at 22.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 84-85.
36. 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
37. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 479
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
38. Id. at 481-83.
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tended to cover private employment discrimination. 9 The Waters
court also decided that the scope of section 1981 extended to ongoing
conditions of employment as well as to legal capacity to contract.4
Such use of section 1981 was restricted, in the view of the Waters
court, to situations where a plaintiff had exhausted Title VII remedies
or showed a reasonable excuse for failure to do so. 4'
In Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co. ,42 the third circuit also
interpreted section 1981 to cover acts of racial harassment in employment. 43 The court decided that the plaintiff's claims of racial harassment and discriminatory practices such as keeping minority workers
in unskilled job classifications were within the scope of the statute."
The Young court noted that in the Reconstruction era the former
slaves had only their personal services about which to contract. Thus
Congress must certainly have had equality in the labor situation in
mind when passing the law. 45 However, Young refused to follow the
Waters view of section 1981's relationship to Title VII. The Young
court concluded that the language of Title VII did not present a
barrier to a section 1981 claim. 6
In Long v. Ford Motor Co. 7 the plaintiff also made a claim of
racial harassment based on section 1981. The plaintiff in Long claimed
dissimilar treatment between black and white employees and denial
of equal training opportunities based on race.48 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's claims were covered by the
statute since "[the purpose for which the Section was enacted ...
requires that a court adopt a broad outlook in enforcing Section
1981." ' 49 The Long court also decided that it would not follow the
39. Id. at 483.

40. Id.
41. Id. at 487.
42. 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971).
43. Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1971).
Plaintiff in Young alleged that his employer and his union were both guilty of
discriminatory practices including keeping minority workers in unskilled job classifications, racial harassment, and a general practice of discriminating against black
employees. Id. at 758. The district court had dismissed plaintiff's complaint on the
basis that section 1981 did not cover private employment and also because it found
plaintiff's failure to file a claim under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to be
fatal to his cause. Id.
44. Id. at 760.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 763.
47. 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974).
48. Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 502 (6th Cir. 1974).
49. Id. at 505.
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view of the Waters court that a section 1981 claim for employment

discrimination could only be brought if the plaintiff exhausted Title
VII remedies or showed a reasonable excuse for failure to do so.5 0 As
Long pointed out, the Waters interpretation was a minority view

among the circuits and opposed a prior ruling in its own circuit."

The Long court also decided that the rules of statutory construction
2
compelled a different result.1
The Supreme Court next had occasion to consider the Civil Rights

Act of 1866 in a claim based on discriminatory working conditions.

In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant employer discriminated against black employees in
job assignments and seniority rules. The plaintiff's claims, in the view
of the Johnson Court, were within the scope of section 1981 . 4 The

Court held that it had joined the well-settled view among the federal
courts of appeal that section 1981 encompasses a claim for discrimi-

nation in private employment on the basis of race and that its coverage

is not limited to exhaustion of Title VII procedures." In reaching this
decision, the Court concluded that Congress had made clear its intent
to provide remedies for employment discrimination under both Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and section 1981 .56 The Court

also determined that Congressional directives did not state a preference

for either statute." Accordingly, the Johnson Court held that "the
remedies available under Title VII and under section 1981, although

related, and although directed to most of the same ends, are separate,
distinct, and independent.""8

50. Id. at 503.
51. Id. The court noted that the third, eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits
had concluded that "Section 1981's availability is not limited to those plaintiffs who
have pursued their Title VII remedies or have shown a reasonable excuse for not
doing so." Id. In addition, the court pointed to Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.,
486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973), which held that a plaintiff was not required to exhaust
Title VII remedies before pursuing a claim under section 1981. Long, 496 F.2d at
503.
52. Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 503-04 (6th Cir. 1974). The court
concluded that if Waters was correct, then Title VII, as the later statute, should have
partially repealed section 1981. Id. In view of the 1964 Act's silence on the issue and
the fact that the two statutes are not "in irreconcilable conflict," the availability of
section 1981 should not be limited "by the existence of remedies under Title VII."
Id. at 504.
53. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
54. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 461.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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In 1976, during the term that Runyon v. McCrary59 was decided,
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co. 60 presented the Supreme
Court with the issue of whether section 1981 applies to discrimination
against white persons. The McDonald Court held that the statute did
apply to discrimination against all persons . 6 As the basis for its
decision, the Court reviewed the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and reaffirmed its holding in Jones that the statute should
be given the broadest possible interpretation in order to give effect to
62
Congressional intent.
Section 1981 was again considered by the Supreme Court in 1982
in General Bldg. ContractorsAss'n v. Pennsylvania.6 The plaintiffs
in General Bldg. Contractorsalleged that the defendant employer and
the local union had discriminated against minority workers in the
operation of a union hiring hall and in the operation of an apprenticeship program 4 Here the central issue was whether section 1981
requires proof of discriminatory intent. 65 The Court found that section
1981 was passed by the same Congress that ratified the fourteenth
amendment and thus the close connection between the two mandated
similar interpretations. 66 In conclusion, the Court held that, like the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, section 1981
requires proof of intentional discrimination. 61
While General Bldg. Contractorsseemed to signal a retreat from
a broad interpretation of section 1981, Goodman v. Lukens Steel
Co. 68 indicated a return to the Supreme Court's liberal reading of the
59. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
60. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). The plaintiffs
in McDonald claimed discriminatory firing because they were fired for misappropriating the defendant employer's cargo while a black accomplice had been retained by
the employer. The district court dismissed the claim on the basis that section 1981
was inapplicable to racial discrimination against whites and the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 275-76.
61. Id. at 287.
62. See Id. at 295-96.
63. 458 U.S. 375 (1982). The plaintiffs in General Bldg. Contractors were the
State of Pennsylvania and several blacks representing a class of racial minorities
seeking work in the construction industry.
64. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 378 (1982).
65. Id.

66. Id. at 390-91.
67. Id. at 391. Justice Brennan dissented from the Court's opinion on the basis

that "this approach ...

is not only unsound, it is also contrary to our prior decisions,

which have consistently given Section 1981 as broad an interpretation as its language
permits." Id. at 408 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
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statute. Like General Bldg. Contractors,Goodman was a class action
by black workers against their employer and several unions alleging
racial discrimination under Title VII and section 1981.69 The plaintiffs
alleged that the employer racially harassed black workers and the
unions tolerated and tacitly encouraged this practice.70 The district

court held that the plaintiffs' claims were covered by section 1981. 1
Since section 1981 deals with the execution and enforcement of
contracts, the district court determined that the appropriate statute of
limitations in this case was the state statute regarding interference
with contractual rights. 72 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected

the district court's narrow view of section 1981 and the Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that "Section 1981 has a much broader focus

than contractual rights." ' 73 The Court further held that the courts
below had properly construed section 1981 to cover the llaintiffs'

ongoing racial harassment as to both the
claims, including those of
74
employer and the union.
The Goodman Court's interpretation of section 1981 is represen-

tative of recent opinions in the federal courts of appeal prior to
Patterson.75 This interpretation is consistent with what Justice Stevens

sees as the Court's earlier construction of the statute as "a guarantee76
of equal opportunity, and not merely a guarantee of equal rights."
69. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 658-59 (1987).
70. Id.
71. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 580 F. Supp. 1114, 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
72. Id. at 1121-22.
73. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661 (1987).
74. Id. at 2625. See also Justice Brennan's separate opinion stating, "Section
1981, in its original conception and its current application, is primarily a proscription
of race discrimination in the execution, administration, and enforcement of contracts." Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. See, e.g., Wilmington v. J.I. Case Co., 793 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1986) (section
1981 covers charges of racial discrimination as to terms and conditions of employment); Hamilton v. Rogers, 791 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1986) (a racist work environment
can violate section 1981); Nazaire v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 807 F.2d 1372, 1380
(7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1039 (1987) ("It is well settled that racial
harassment may be the basis of an independent claim of a violation of both Title
VII and Section 1981."); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir.
1986) ("failure to take reasonable steps to prevent a barrage of racist acts, epithets,
and threats can make an employer liable"); Ramsey v. American Air Filter Co., 772
F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1985) (employer's acts of racial harassment held to violate section
1981); Carter v. Duncan-Higgins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (unequal
treatment in day-to-day working environment violates section 1981).
76. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2395 (1989) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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By confining section 1981 to the narrowly-defined situations of "making" and "enforcing" contracts, the Patterson Court insists it is not
retreating in the area of equal rights," yet it seems to be taking a step
backward in its guarantee of equal opportunity. In Patterson, the
Court retreats from the liberal interpretation given section 1981 in
Runyon and its progeny such as Johnson and, most recently, Goodman. Such a retreat cannot but serve as a signal to minorities that all
section 1981 claims for equal opportunity will be required to fit into
the narrow confines of the Court's interpretation or be lost.
III.
A.

PATTERSON V. MCLEAN CREDIT UNION

FACTS

Ms. Patterson was employed by the respondent McLean Credit
Union in May 1972 as a teller and file coordinator. 8 During the ten
years that she worked at McLean, Ms. Patterson claimed she was
subjected to working conditions which were abusive and demeaning. 79
These conditions included being stared at for long periods of time by
her supervisor, being told other employees did not like her because
she was black, being given demeaning tasks not assigned to other
clerical workers (such as dusting and sweeping the office), and being
given oppressive work loads and later being rebuked for being slow,
which she was told was a trait of black people. 0
In addition, Ms. Patterson's supervisor made a point of criticizing
her work at staff meetings, while white employees were criticized in
private.8 ' Ms. Patterson also claimed that a promised pay increase
after a six month tenure at McLean was denied, even though white
employees were regularly given such raises. 8 2 Similarly, white employees were offered training for higher-level positions and informed of
promotion opportunities while Ms. Patterson was not, despite her
stated desire to advance in the company. 3 Ms. Patterson's claim for
failure to promote also alleged that a less-senior white employee was
77. Id. at 2379.

78. Brief for Petitioner at LEXIS Screens 12-13, Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), No. 87-107 (LEXIS, Genfed library, Brief file).
79. Id. at LEXIS Screen 13.
80. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2392 (1989) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (quoting trial transcript).
81. Id. at 2392 (quoting trial transcript).
82. Id. (quoting trial transcript).
83. Id. (quoting trial transcript).
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promoted ahead of her.84 Finally, Ms. Patterson claimed that her
layoff in 1982 was discriminatory since white employees with less
seniority and experience were not discharged.85 Thus, Ms. Patterson
brought section 1981 claims for discriminatory discharge, failure to
promote, and racial harassment.8 6 In addition, Ms. Patterson brought
a state law tort action for intentional infliction of mental and emo-

tional distress .87

The District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina
submitted petitioner's section 1981 claims for discriminatory discharge
and failure to promote to the jury, both of which were decided in
favor of respondent.88 As to petitioner's section 1981 claim of racial
harassment, the district court determined that section 1981 did not
89
cover such an action and refused to submit that issue to the jury.
The court also did not submit the state law claim to the jury on the
basis that the employer's conduct did not rise to the level of outrageousness required under North Carolina law.9° Thus, directed verdicts
91
were granted in favor of respondent on the latter two claims.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court
in all respects, finding that "standing alone, racial harassment does
not abridge the right to make and enforce contracts . . conferred by
Section 1981. '"92 The court held that the broader provisions of Title
VII encompass such claims, while the narrow provisions of section
3
1981 should not be interpreted so broadly. 9 The court stated that the
cases cited by the petitioner did not directly hold to the contrary, but
noted that cases such as Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. 94 and Croker
v. Boeing Co. 95 indicated that section 1981 can accommodate such a
84. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1144.
87. Id.
88. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2369 (1989).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1144 (4th Cir. 1986).
92. Id. at 1146.
93. Id. at 1145.
94. 482 U.S. 656 (1987). The issue in Goodman was which statute of limitations
should govern a section 1981 claim, the state statute governing personal injuries or
the statute applicable to interference with contractual rights. The Goodman court
chose the personal injury statute noting that "Section 1981 has a much broader focus
than contractual rights ... guaranteeing the personal right to engage in economically
significant activity free from racially discriminatory interference." Id. at 661-62. See
supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
95. 437 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Pa. 1977), modified on other grounds, 662 F.2d
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claim, along with Title VII.96 Given the narrow language of the statute,
however, the court felt that only interference with the right to "make"
or "enforce" contracts is within the scope of section 1981. 97
Patterson was first argued before the Supreme Court in 1988.9s
At that time, the Court restored the case to the calendar for reargument on the issue of whether the interpretation of section 1981 as set
forth in Runyon v. McCrary should be reconsidered.9 The Court did
this wholly on its own initiative since neither of the parties in Patterson
requested such a reconsideration. 100
B.

THE COURT'S OPINION

Justice Kennedy, writing for the five-member majority, reaffirmed the Runyon Court's interpretation of section 1981 making that
statute applicable to the private sector. 01 The Court further held,
however, that section 1981 does not cover racial harassment which
involves the ongoing terms and conditions of employment because the
statute only encompasses the formation and enforcement of contracts.01 2 Finally, the Court held that the district court erred in its
instruction to the jury regarding the plaintiff's burden of proof in the
discriminatory promotion claim.103
In reaffirming Runyon, the Court made reference to the debate
over the legislative history and intent of section 1981 and noted that
some members of the Court still believe Runyon was incorrectly
decided.' °4 This was considered insufficient, however, to overturn a
precedent which "is entirely consistent with our society's deep commitment to the eradication of discrimination based on a person's race
or the color of his or her skin."'0 5 Also rejected was the argument
that Runyon should be overruled because it frustrates the objectives
975 (3d Cir. 1981). Croker considered the issue of whether the statute of limitations
for plaintiff's Title VII claim should also govern his section 1981 claim. The Croker
court cited Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975), stating
that the two statutes provided separate and distinct causes of action, and thus separate
statutes of limitation were warranted. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
96. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir. 1986).
97. Id. at 1145-46.
98. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S.Ct. 1419 (1988).
99. Id. at 1420.

100. Id. at 1422 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2369 (1989).
Id. at 2372-73.
Id. at 2377.
Id. at 2370.
Id. at 2371.
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of Title VII.' ° A "sound construction" of section 1981's language,
the Court stated, achieves an interpretation of section 1981 which is
not inconsistent with Congress' objectives in Title VII. 07
However, the Court then determined that the Runyon interpretation that section 1981 covers private conduct was insufficient to
decide the case before it.1°8 The issue to be decided was whether the
conduct alleged by Ms. Patterson fell within the rights protected by
the statute.o9 The Court proceeded to examine the language of section
1981 and define the enumerated rights protected by the statute. 0 The
right to "make" contracts, the Court held, applies only to the
formation process of the contract and not to conduct that arises from
later conditions of employment." 1 The Court reasoned that such
postformation conduct involves only performance provisions which
govern continuing employment and as such are "more naturally"
encompassed by the broader provisions of Title VII and state contract
law. 2 Further, the Court found that section 1981's right to "enforce"
contracts is limited to those situations where an employer's conduct
directly impairs the employee's ability to enforce established contract
rights through the legal process." 3
As support for this "plain language" interpretation of the statute,
the Court cited Justice White's dissent in Runyon. 114 In that opinion,
Justice White concluded that the plain language of section 1981
regarding the enforcement of contracts can apply to nothing other
than the removal of any legal disability to file a cause of action., 5
The Court then proceeded to apply these principles to Ms. Patterson's
6
case."

In applying its "plain language" interpretation of the statute, the
majority found that petitioner's claims of racial harassment involved
"postformation conduct" by the employer which related, not to the
making or enforcement of the employment contract, but to the "terms
106. Id.
107. Id.

at 2372.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.

112. Id. at 2373.
113. Id.
114. Id.

115. Id. (citing Justice White's dissenting opinion in Runyon v. McCrary, 427

U.S. 160, 195 n.5 (1976)).
116. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2373 (1989).
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Therefore, this type of

conduct was not actionable under the plain language of the statute."18
Rather, the Court found this type of conduct to be precisely within
the scope of Title VII's coverage." 9 The Court decided that a broader

reading of section 1981 would undermine the administrative review

and conciliatory procedures that Congress established in Title VII to
handle claims of racial discrimination in the workplace. 20
The Court then conceded that some overlap exists between the
two statutes. In situations where both statutes apply, a potential
plaintiff is free to bring an action under section 1981.121 The Court
pointed out, however, that the possibility of two separate actions
should not preclude it from narrowly construing section 1981 where
the result of a broad interpretation would be to circumvent the detailed
procedures established in Title VII. 2 2 Where two statutes both deal

with the same issues, the Court felt precedent dictated that the earlier
statute should be given a narrower reading to avoid conflict with

more elaborate procedures found in the later statute. 2 3
The Court next considered alternative interpretations of section
1981 offered by the Solicitor General 2 4 and by Justice Brennan. The
Solicitor General's interpretation would give meaning to contract
117. Id. at 2374.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.at 2374-75. Title VII provides for a commission to review charges and
determine whether reasonable cause exists to pursue the charges made. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(b) (1982).
121. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2375 (1989).
122. Id.
123. Id. In support of this proposition, the Court cited United States v. Fausto,
484 U.S. 439 (1988). Fausto interpreted the Civil Service Reform Act to preclude
judicial review of unfavorable employment decisions made as to certain classes of
federal employees. The Court based its decision on Congress' silence as to judicial
review for these classes, while provision was made for other classes, and also on
legislative history showing that Congress intended to simplify the appeals procedure
in the civil service system. In contrast, the legislative history of Title VII cited by the
Patterson dissent shows Congress' express intent that section 1981 claims not be
limited by the later statute. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363,
2386-87 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 3172 (1972)).
124. The United States Solicitor General is a direct subordinate of the Attorney
General of the United States. The duties of the Solicitor General include representing
the United States government in cases before the Supreme Court and supervising the
preparation of the government's Supreme Court briefs (including amicus briefs such
as the one filed in Patterson). SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS, U.S. PRINTING
OFFICE, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 372-73 (1989-90).
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25
rights contained in section 1981 based on state contract law. In his
brief, the Solicitor General argued almost all states imply a covenant
of good faith and fair dealing into all contracts, including employment
contracts. 26 Subject to such a covenant, parties to an employment
contract are required to refrain from conduct which would wrongfully
27
hinder or prevent performance by the other party. 1 Such conduct, if
racially motivated and severe, can serve to establish that an employee
who was harassed was deprived of a contract right-that is, the
enjoyment of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing enjoyed by
employees of other races. 2 s The Solicitor General concluded that the
breach of such a covenant supplies the necessary contractual predicate
for a section 1981 claim by showing that black employees were denied
29 The
the right to contract on the same terms as white employees.
Solicitor General went on to state that reliance on state contract law
would be logical because section 1981 did not create a federal law of
contracts.'°
The Court rejected this view, however, on the ground that it
gives section 1981 "no actual substantive content" but instead only
provides a remedy where it exists in state contract law.' The Court
already formed
also found that an employer's breach of a contract
2
did not implicate the right to make a contract.1
Similar to the Solicitor General's position, Justice Brennan, in
his dissenting opinion, proposed the view that racial harassment which
is severe and extensive in itself can implicate section 1981 by denying
a party the right to make an employment contract on the same basis
as a white employee.' 3 3 This view was also rejected by the Court in
favor of the view that in order for section 1981 to apply, an employer
' 3 4 intentionally
must "at the time of the formation of the contract'
deny to the employee the right to enter into such an employment

125. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2375 (1989).
126. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
LEXIS Screen 17, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), No.
87-107 (LEXIS, Genfed library, Brief file).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at LEXIS Screens 29-30.
130. Id. at LEXIS Screen 31.
131. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2375-76 (1989).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2389 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his separate dissent, Justice Stevens
agrees with Justice Brennan's view on this point. Id. at 2395-96 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
134. Id. at 2376-77 (emphasis in original).
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contract on racially-neutral terms. 35 The fact that the harassment is
severe or continual should not, according to the majority, allow a
plaintiff to "bootstrap" a postformation conduct claim into a section
13 6
1981 claim.

The Court next examined petitioner's claim of discriminatory
promotion. Although it did not disturb the fourth circuit's finding
that Ms. Patterson's claim in this area was covered by section 1981,
the majority noted that lower courts "should not strain in an undue

manner the language of Section 1981" when making this determination. 37 Such a claim can only be made under section 1981 when the
change in position of the employee would have involved a new contract
with the employer, to the extent the employer has refused the employee
the opportunity to make the new contract. 3 '
Finally, the Court considered the district court's jury instruction
regarding petitioner's discriminatory promotion claim. The Court was

unanimous in its view that the district court erred in instructing the

jury that petitioner could only succeed in her claim by proving that
she was better qualified than the white employee who was promoted. 319

The Court summarized the scheme of proof'40 which the court of
appeals properly noted applies in section 1981 as well as Title VII

claims, but found that the lower courts mistakenly described petitioner's burden under that scheme.' 4'
135. Id. at 2377.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2377-78 (1989). The
standard for burden of proof in employment discrimination cases was set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Under McDonnell Douglas and
Burdine, a plaintiff must initially prove racial discrimination by a preponderance of
the evidence to create an inference of discrimination. The defendant may then rebut
this inference with evidence that the plaintiff was rejected or another person was
chosen for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. If the defendant is successful, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to persuade the jury that the discrimination was
intentional. However, in a recent case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775
(1989), decided shortly before Patterson, a four-member plurality held that in a
mixed-motive situation (where both legitimate and illegitimate factors played a part
in an employment decision), the employer may defend itself by proving by a
"preponderance of the evidence" that the same decision would have been reached
absent the illegitimate factor (rather than the more difficult standard of "clear and
convincing evidence").
141. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2378 (1989).
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The Court held that a plaintiff may present various types of
evidence to show that a defendant's proffered reasons for its decisions
were not the controlling reasons.1 42 That evidence includes, but is not
limited to, proving that she was in fact better qualified than the
applicant who was hired or promoted. 43 Thus, the Court found that
the district court erred in its instruction that the petitioner in this case
could only succeed if she made such a showing of better qualifications.'" This part of the fourth circuit's decision was vacated and the
for further proceedings in accordance with the Court's
case remanded
1 45
guidelines.
The Court concluded that in cases where the scope of a statute
is at issue, its role is simply one of statutory interpretation, in which
it must be guided by Congressional actions.146 When reviewing only a
part of Congress' extensive civil rights legislation, the Court must
limit its decision to whether the particular statute applies to the
actions alleged by the plaintiff before it. 47 The Court then stated its
view that current law is a reflection of our society's consensus
deploring racial discrimination and added that its decisions in no way
signal a retreat from this stand.' 48
C.

ANALYSIS

As Justice Brennan noted in his dissenting opinion, "[w]hat the
Court declines to snatch away with one hand, it takes with the
other."1 49 The majority claimed adherence to principles of stare decisis
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2378-79.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2379.
147. Id. But see Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S.
409, 420 (1986) (when Congress has specifically reexamined a certain area of law and
left a Supreme Court interpretation untouched, the Court should strive not to alter
that interpretation); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S.
235, 238 (1970) ("Statutory interpretation requires more than concentration upon
isolated words; rather, consideration must be given to the total corpus of pertinent
law and the policies that inspired ostensibly inconsistent provisions."); Brief of 66
Members of the United States Senate and 118 Members of the United States House
of Representatives as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at LEXIS Screen 26,
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), No. 87-107 (LEXIS
Genfed library, Brief file) ("Congress must be able to assume that a construction of
a statute, rendered by this Court after full and fair consideration, is fixed so that the
Congress can build upon it if it chooses.").
148. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2379 (1989).
149. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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in reaffirming Runyon.5 0 This adherence must be questioned, however, when the principles applied to the case at hand are those of the
dissenting opinion in Runyon. 5 ' While the majority reaffirmed the
holding in Runyon that section 1981 applies to private sector acts of
discrimination, it followed the conclusion of the Runyon dissent in
its "plain language" interpretation of that statute. 52
The majority's narrow confinement of the statute ignored the
legislative history as it was reviewed and accepted by the Runyon
Court.'5 3 The Runyon majority, following the lead of the Jones Court,
determined that employers' acts of persecution against the freed slaves
were a primary concern of Congress in enacting section 1981.1 4 The
Runyon majority also cited the Court's holding in Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc. 55 as further support that section 1981 covers
discrimination during employment. 6 In view of such a conclusion, it
would logically follow that the statute was intended to cover conduct
after a contract was formed. 57
Such a reading of the statute would find discriminatory postformation conduct to indicate that the contract could not have been
made in a nondiscriminatory manner.1 8 If the employer made all
employee contracts on equal terms, no disparate treatment should
result.
The relevant question the majority would ask in a section 1981
claim is whether the alleged conduct related to the making or enforcement of a contract. 5 9 A more relevant question might be whether
such conduct would serve to effectively dispel any claim that the
contract was entered into in a racially-neutral manner. 16° Proof of
working conditions for black employees which are significantly different from conditions enjoyed by similarly-situated white employees

150. Id. at 2370-71.
151. Id. at 2373. The Court's opinion quoted from Justice White's dissent in
Runyon and then proceeded to apply those principles to the case before it.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2388 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976). See supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
155. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
156. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 171.
157. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2379 (1989) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 2388-89.
159. Id. at 2369 (majority opinion).
160. Id. at 2389 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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not been afforded the
could be evidence that the black employees had
1 61
contract.
employment
an
make
to
right
same
This analysis is consistent with the majority's view of the plaintiff's burden of proof in a discriminatory promotion case. As the
majority opinion noted, to be actionable under section 1981, a promotion must involve the opportunity to enter into a new contract
with the employer. 62 Yet the plaintiff in such a situation may prove
intentional discrimination in the promotion decision by presenting
evidence of the employer's past treatment of the employee, including
evidence of racial harassment.1 63 It seems incongruous to allow a
plaintiff to use such evidence to prove discriminatory intent upon
promotion but not allow the evidence to prove that an initial hiring
contract could not have been made on equal terms.
The fact that such racial harassment is covered by Title VII is,
according to Justice Brennan, an insufficient basis for the majority's
interpretation.164 Like the majority, Justice Brennan also recognized
the dual coverage offered by Title VII and section 1981.165 A review
of legislative history in the Patterson dissent, however, points to a
more liberal interpretation of section 1981 as a viable alternative to
66
Title VII employment discrimination actions.1 This review cited a
1972 proposed amendment to Title VII which would have eliminated
a remedy under section 1981 where one was available under Title
VII. 167 Such an amendment was rejected by Congress on the basis
that given the damaging nature of employment discrimination, a
potential plaintiff should be afforded every opportunity available for
a remedy.1 61 Congress could not have made any clearer its intent to
maintain section 1981 as a viable alternative to Title VII as a remedy
for workplace discrimination.
Further evidence of Congressional intent regarding section 1981
can be found in a 1976 law making attorneys' fees available to
successful section 1981 claimants. 69 The act was a result of Congressional dissatisfaction with the availability of attorneys' fees only in
Title VII actions.' 70 Like the rejection of the proposed 1972 amend161. Id.

162. Id. at 2377 (majority opinion).
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 2378.
Id. at 2386-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 3172 (1972)).
Id. (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 3371-72 (1972)).
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1976, 5908-11.
Id.
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ment to Title VII, this action can be viewed as a positive indication
of Congress' awareness of the overlap between Title VII and section
1981 and its intent to not imply a preference for one over the other. 1 71
,
Additionally, Title VII is restricted to employment discrimination,
while no such restriction is applicable to section 1981. In this respect,
the, majority's reliance on Title VII in interpreting section 1981 may
be misleading.' 72 Section 1981 has been used as a redress for contractual discrimination in a variety of situations not covered by Title VII,
including entrance to private schools,' racially based bank policies, 74
and discrimination in amusement park admissions policies.7 5 The
majority's narrow interpretation of the statute to avoid overlap with
Title VII will impact the availability of section 1981 as a remedy for
discrimination in areas which do not conform to the employment
7
relationship required under Title VII.1 6
Even in the area of employment discrimination, section 1981 may
be necessary to provide a remedy to potential plaintiffs unable to
meet the prerequisites of Title VII. 77 A significant percentage of the
workforce, almost 15 percent, is not covered by Title VII because of
that statute's employer size requirement of 15 or more employees.7 8
This represents approximately 86.3 percent of all work establishments
which are excluded from Title VII's coverage and 10.7 million workers
who must look for a remedy elsewhere. 79
It is feared that the majority's narrow interpretation can only
serve to open gaps in federal antidiscrimination programs, leaving
potential litigants without a remedy for discrimination in federal
171. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2387-88 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 2390.
173. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
174. Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1978).
175. Scott v. Young, 307 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Va. 1969).
176. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2390 (1989) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 2391.

178. Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 18, at 603. The authors did a study of
three federal court districts for fiscal year 1980-81 to determine the extent to which
section 1981 was used as compared to other civil rights statutes. Their study found
that section 1981 ranks as the third most widely used of the federal civil rights
statutes, having been invoked 252 times in the one year compared to 506 invocations
of section 1983 and 433 of Title VII. When these figures were extrapolated to derive
a national estimate, the study found that approximately 3,190 section 1981 claims
are filed in one year.
179. Id. at 602.
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court. 8 0 Yet the Patterson majority repeatedly emphasized its commitment to the eradication of all discrimination.'' Only time will tell
if the Court's holding in Patterson is consistent with such commitment.
IV.

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF PATTERSON

In the words of one commentator, "this [Supreme Court] term
has signaled a retreat of a great deal more than an inch on civil n
rights, and it is now up to Congress to initiate changes in that
direction."' 82 Congressional action has been initiated," s3 but it could
180. Id. at 604.
181. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2371, 2374, 2379
(1989).
182. Pinzler, A Major Change in Bias Law for the Work Place, THE NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 21, 1989, at S5, col. 3. (Ms. Pinzler discusses, along with the Patterson
decision, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (severely
restricting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), as to disparate impact
cases under Title VII); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989)
(describing the employer's standard of proof in mixed motive situations as a preponderance of the evidence rather than clear and convincing evidence); Jett v. Dallas
Independent School District, 109 S.Ct. 2702 (1989) (restricting § 1981 suits against
government officials to those involving official state policy)).
183. On February 7, 1990, the Civil Rights Act of 1990 was introduced in the
House of Representatives (H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H364
(1990)) and the Senate (S.2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. S1018
(1990)). The stated purposes of the Act are:
(1) to respond to the Supreme Court's recent decisions by restoring the civil
rights protections that were dramatically limited by those decisions; and
(2) to strengthen existing protections and remedies available under Federal
civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence and adequate compensation for victims of discrimination. H.R. 4000 § 2.
The Act amends section 1981 by adding a new subsection at the end of the statute

as follows:

For purposes of this section, the right to "make and enforce contracts"
shall include the making, performance, modification and termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions
of the contractual relationship.
H.R. 4000 § 12.
In introducing the bill in the Senate, Senator Kennedy referred to the Patterson
decision and described it as:
[Aln artificial distinction that prohibits race discrimination in hiring workers,
but leaves workers on the job unprotected from harassment or from being
fired or denied promotion because of racial prejudice ...and it should be
overruled by Congress.
136 CONG. REC. S1018 (1990).
The Deputy Attorney General, in a statement before the Comm. on Education and
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be years before any legislation is enacted. 8 4 Until that time, the courts
are left with the task of sorting out what, if anything, remains of
section 1981.
A.

CASELAW

Absent Congressional action, the future of section 1981 as a
remedy for discrimination in the workplace is extremely limited. Since
the narrowing of section 1981 in Patterson, verdicts have been consistently in favor of defendant employers.
In the seventh circuit, there seems to be confusion as to what
racial discrimination claims are foreclosed by section 1981 after
Patterson. One example of such post-Patterson confusion in that
circuit is Malhotra v. Cotter & Co.'85 The Malhotra court thought it
anomalous that a stranger to a company could file an action under
section 1981 if his or her application for a position was rejected based
on race. 8 6 Yet a current employee might have no cause of action for
failure to promote to the same position unless such promotion created
a "new and distinct contractual relation," even if the current employee
87
could prove discrimination.
Although questioning the logic of Patterson, the Malhotra majority, with some uncertainty, determined that plaintiff's claim of
retaliatory firing was not covered by section 1981.188 Judge Cudahy,
in his concurring opinion, found that a prohibition against retaliation
Labor and the Comm. on the Judiciary, stated: "[W]e believe that Congress should
amend the law to require a different result than that reached by the Supreme Court

in Patterson." The Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearings on H.R. 4000 Before the
Committee on Education and Labor and the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil and ConstitutionalRights, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990). In addition

to the Patterson decision, the Act is intended to overrule the Supreme Court's
decisions in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) and Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). 136 CONG. REc. S1021 (1990). See
supra note 182.
184. See discussion of Civil Rights Restoration Act infra notes 220-225 and
accompanying text.
185. 885 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1989). (Malhotra concerned a plaintiff of Indian
ancestry claiming racial harassment, failure to promote, and retaliatory firing. The
district judge had granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part and remanded on the issue of plaintiff's
promotion claims. On remand, the district court must determine if such claims
comport with the Supreme Court's standard of "new and distinct relations.").
186. Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1311 (7th Cir. 1989).
187. Id. at 1311.
188. Id. at 1312 (apologizing to the Supreme Court for "suggesting that the
scope of Patterson is uncertain").
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is required in order to enforce a non-discriminatory provision.8 9 He
reasoned that such conduct by an employer clearly impairs an employee's right to enforce contract rights. 19° Absent a form of redress,
the rights guaranteed by the statute would be nullified.' 9'
In Brooms v. Regal Tube Co.,192 the seventh circuit again fol-

lowed the restrictive interpretation of section 1981 mandated by
Patterson. In Brooms, the plaintiff succeeded in proving claims of
egregious racial and sexual harassment of the plaintiff by her supervisor, which included offensive sexual advances and the sending of
racially offensive pornographic pictures. 93 Although it considered the
activity to be reprehensible, the Brooms court found the conduct in

question did not involve either the formation process of a contract or

the right to enforce contractual obligations and was thus foreclosed
by Patterson.194
As to racial harassment, a similar decision was reached by the
sixth circuit in Lynch v. Belden & Co. 195 The Lynch majority held

that under Patterson, postformation discriminatory conduct on the

189. Id. at 1314 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 1314 n.1.
191. Id. at 1314 ("The ability to seek enforcement and protection of one's right
to be free of discrimination is an integral part of the right itself.") (quoting Goff v.
Continental Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1982)).
192. Nos. 87-2362, 87-2522, 87-2558, 87-2559 (7th Cir. August 4, 1989) (LEXIS
Genfed library, 7th Cir. file).
193. Id. at LEXIS Screens *2-*3.
194. Id. at LEXIS Screen *28. But see English v. General Development Corp.,
717 F. Supp. 628, 631 (N.D. Ill. 1989) sum. judgment granted in part, denied in part
(N.D. 11. Jan 31, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, 7th Cir. file), ("the question under
Section 1981 remains whether the employer, at the time of the formation of the
contract in fact intentionally refused to enter into a contract with the employee on
racially neutral terms," indicating postformation conduct can be evidence of discriminatory contract terms at the time the contract was made). Like Judge Cudahy in
Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1989), the English court held that
retaliatory discharge claims survive Patterson. English, 717 F. Supp. at 630. However,
in Dangerfield v. The Mission Press, No. 88 C 7199 (N.D. I1l. July 27, 1989) (LEXIS
Genfed library, 7th Cir. file), the court found that plaintiff's claim of retaliatory
discharge was not actionable under section 1981 after Patterson. Dangerfield at
LEXIS Screen *3. See also Jones v. Alltech Associates, Inc., No. 85 C 10345 (N.D.
I11.Sept. 1, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, 7th Cir. file at LEXIS Screen *16) ("The
clear import of the [Patterson] holding ... is that [plaintiff] cannot seek relief under
Section 1981 for a racially motivated discharge."); Hall v. County of Cook, 719 F.
Supp. 721, 724 (N.D. I11.1989) ("discharge from employment is beyond the scope
of Section 1981 as construed in Patterson.").
195. 882 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1134 (1990).
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part of the employer is more appropriately handled by state contract
law for breach of contract and Title VII.196
On the other hand, in the tenth circuit the Colorado district court
has given Patterson a broad interpretation in two recent cases. In
Padilla v. United Air Lines,1 97 the court held that plaintiff's claim of
discriminatory termination was not precluded by Patterson since such
termination impaired his ability to make an employment contract. 98
In Jordan v. U.S. West Direct Co.,' 99 the same court found that
while a charge of racial harassment in the workplace is no longer
actionable under section 1981, a charge of retaliatory discharge survives Patterson.20 The Jordan court reasoned that retaliation is a tool
an employer can use to obstruct a potential plaintiff's efforts to
enforce a contract through legal means and thus is covered by the
provisions of the statute. 01
While it is still too early to predict a general trend in postPatterson cases, confusion as to what claims are now covered under
section 1981 seems inescapable. As the Malhotra202 court noted,
vagueness is almost inevitable when setting down rules that will have
to be applied to circumstances and factual patterns not conceived of
at the time an opinion is written. 203 In the words of one court that
has considered the issue, application of those rules will be further
complicated by the fact that, "[w]ithout question, [Patterson] signifies
a dramatic departure from prior caselaw interpreting the rights pro4

tected by Section 1981.'

'20

B. TITLE VII CLAIMS

Although the Patterson majority hinted that a broad interpretation of section 1981 may be used by potential plaintiffs to circumvent
the procedural and conciliatory requirements of Title VII,2° at least
196. Lynch v. Belden & Co., 882 F.2d 262, 266-67 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied

110 S. Ct. 1134 (1990).
197. 716 F. Supp. 485 (D. Colo. 1989).
198. Padilla v. United Air Lines, 716 F. Supp. 485, 490 (D. Colo. 1989).
199. 716 F. Supp. 1366 (D. Colo. 1989).
200. Jordan v. U.S. West Direct Co., 716 F. Supp. 1366, 1368 (D. Colo. 1989).
201. Id. This view is also expounded by Judge Cudahy in Malhotra v. Cotter &
Co., 885 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1989).
202. Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1305.
203. Id. at 1312.
204. Hall v. County of Cook, 719 F. Supp. 721, 724 (N.D. I1. 1989).
205. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2375 (1989).
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one study has found this not to be the case. 0 One commentator
noted the many benefits of bringing a Title VII action along with the
section 198i claim.2 °7 The filing of the Title VII charge along with a
section 1981 claim is seen as a minor, procedural obstacle in view of
the many benefits incurred. 20 These benefits include an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) investigation which can
often better inform the charging parties and their counsel as to the
employer's defenses; the possibility that the EEOC will sue on the
charging party's behalf; and, since a 1981 cause of action can be
added to a Title VII suit, a plaintiff has an increased possibility of
obtaining a favorable decision under one or the other when filing
under both.2°
In addition, the statistics regarding litigation in the employment
discrimination area do not support the Patterson majority's claim that
section 1981 may be used to circumvent Title VII's statutory prerequisites. 210 As suggested by Justice Brennan, a more likely reason for
bringing a section 1981 action without an accompanying Title VII suit
could be that the plaintiff could not meet one of the procedural
1
obstacles required under Title VII. 2 I For example, while Title VII
2' 1
section 1981
only covers employers who have 15 or more employees
has no such prerequisite.
Title VII also mandates that a charge be brought within 180 days
'3
after the discriminatory practice occurred," while section 1981 usually
follows the more liberal statute of limitations for personal injuries
within the subject state.2 14 While Title VII encourages conciliation and
administrative review rather than litigation, the shorter statute of

206. See Livingston & Marcosson, supra note 20, at 989-90 (over 950o of Title
VII actions do not result in congressionally-mandated conciliation, thus the lack of
a conciliation requirement in section 1981 is not the exception to a Title VII cause
of action). Cf. Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 18, at 599 (the fact that Title VII
suits outnumber § 1981 suits by almost two-to-one seems not to support circumvention
of Title VII in favor of § 1981).
207. Livingston & Marcosson, supra note 20, at 990.
208. Id. Professors Eisenberg and Schwab found that of the cases they studied,
8401o filed a Title VII claim, half of which also included a section 1981 claim.
Eisenberg & Schwab, supra, note 18, at 603.
209. Livingston & Marcosson, supra note 20, at 990.
210. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
211. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2391 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982).
214. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987). See supra notes 69-74
and accompanying text..
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limitation can serve to encourage litigation in cases where a potential
plaintiff must decide to pursue a claim or lose it forever. Section
1981's longer statute can serve as a cooling-off period, encouraging
the plaintiff to seek other employment or seek resolution through
other methods before the statute of limitations runs. In this way,
section 1981 can actually serve to avoid frivolous litigation by allowing
a potential plaintiff more time to reflect on what has occurred.
In addition, section 1981 covers employers which are not covered
by Title VII such as bona fide membership clubs and the uniformed
military service.2" 5 In appropriate cases, section 1981 provides for
punitive damages which are not obtainable under Title VII.216 Plaintiffs filing under section 1981 can request a jury trial which is not
available under Title VII.217 Section 1981 also provides for a backpay
award beyond the two-year limit of Title VII.218
The Patterson Court's virtual elimination of section 1981 as a
remedy for racial discrimination in the workplace will have its deepest
effect on potential plaintiffs who are unable to file under Title VII
or whose claims warrant a remedy which Title VII cannot provide.
Without a cause of action under section 1981, these people may be
left without a remedy in federal court, regardless of the egregiousness
of the racial discrimination they have suffered.
C.

LEGISLATION

Legislation to overturn the restrictive interpretation given to
section 1981 by the Patterson Court has been introduced in Congress.21 9 But prior experience indicates this can be a long and difficult
road. In Grove City College v. Bell,220 the Supreme Court narrowly
interpreted sanctions specified by section 902 of Title IX of the
215. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(2) (1982). See also Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193,

1200 (8th
216.
217.
218.

Cir. 1981).
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
Ward v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 823 F.2d 907, 908 (5th Cir. 1987).
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).

219. See supra note 183.

220. 465 U.S. 555 (1984). Students enrolled at Grove City College were recipients
of federal grant money. The Department of Education required the College to execute
an Assurance of Compliance stating that it would follow federal regulations as to
sex discrimination in programs and activities. The College refused, contending that
it received no direct federal funds and thus was not covered by Title IX. The
Department then declared the College ineligible to receive the grant money, and the
affected students filed suit. Grove City College challenged the authority of the
Department to refuse such grants on the basis of the statutory language which made
reference to "program" and "activity" rather than entire institutions.
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Education Amendments of 1972221 to apply to only a particular
program within an institution receiving federal funds. Thus, while
students throughout the college received federal grant funds, the Court
decided that only the specific program receiving federal financial
assistance (in this case, the financial aid program) was obligated to
follow Department of Education guidelines.2 22 This interpretation was
based on Title IX's program-specific language and what the Court
considered to be Congressional intent in enacting Title IX.223
On May 23, 1984, three months after the Grove City College
decision, the House Committee on Education and Labor and the
House Committee on the Judiciary introduced a bill to counter this
narrow interpretation given Title IX. 224 The Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987 passed the Senate on January 28, 1988225 and was
promptly vetoed by President Reagan on March 16, 1988. After only
six days, the veto was overturned. 226 Thus, Congress was finally able
to clarify and give effect to its intent, but not until four years after
the Court confined the law to a narrow, plain language interpretation.
While the fact that Congressional action has been initiated is
encouraging, there is no reason to believe that the long struggle
endured by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 should be any
shorter with the current legislation. During the four years between
the Grove City College decision and the passage of the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987, educational institutions receiving federal
funds were not subject to sanctions for any discrimination unless the
particular program being funded discriminated. 227 The same situation
can be foreseen in the interim of post-Patterson legislation. Employers, particularly those not subject to Title VII sanctions, are arguably
free to discriminate against employees on racial or other grounds so
long as they refrain from discrimination in the making and enforcing
of contracts. Absent an express contractual situation, it is difficult to

221. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982).
222. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 571-72 (1984).
223. Id.
224. Robinson, Allen & Franklin, The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987:
Broadening the Scope of Civil Rights Legislation, LABOR L.J. 45, 45-46 (Jan. 1989).
225. Id. at 46.
226. Id. at 46-47 (the votes were 73 to 24 in the Senate and 292 to 133 in the
House).
227. Brief of 66 Members of the United States Senate and 118 Members of the
United States House of Representatives as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
LEXIS Screen 24, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), No.
87-107 (LEXIS, Genfed library, Brief file).
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see how section 1981 can provide any relief to victims of such
discrimination.
V.

CONCLUSION

Central to the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson were the
decisions in Runyon v. McCrary and its progeny holding that racial
discrimination would not be tolerated in either the public or private
sector. These decisions, along with Congressional action in the area,
served as the foundation for the public's assurance that the federal
government and federal courts would enforce and broadly interpret
anti-discrimination laws.
Prior to Patterson, section 1981 was seen as an alternative to an
employment discrimination action under Title VII. The federal appellate courts and Congress itself had approved such an interpretation
of the statute. The Supreme Court, though never having squarely
addressed the issue of ongoing harassment and discrimination under
section 1981, had in prior decisions given section 1981 a liberal
interpretation which indicated its approval of the treatment given the
statute by the appellate courts. This broad interpretation can be seen
in decisions such as Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 228 and
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. 229 The spirit of this interpretation was
embodied in the Runyon decision, 230 to which the Pattersonmajority
claimed adherence. While Patterson declined to overturn the letter of
Runyon, the spirit of that decision seems to have been largely ignored
by the Court.
The Patterson Court's narrow confinement of section 1981 to
cover only the making and the enforcement of contracts will preclude
most claims of racial harassment in the workplace. This decision deals
a mortal blow to the foundation of public assurance regarding antidiscrimination legislation. Such a result cannot but call into question
the present Supreme Court's support of its statement that "discrimination based on the color of one's skin is a profound wrong of tragic

dimension.
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421 U.S. 454 (1975). See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
482 U.S. 656 (1987). See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Blum, supra note 20,; Sullivan, supra note 20.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2379 (1989).

